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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER SIMON CASTILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060811-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, and one count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony. Defendant's guilty pleas were entered conditionally pursuant to State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct App. 1988). This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from 
second and third degree felonies pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant was arrested for pointing a chrome pistol at two different victims while 
trying to avoid arrest. A chrome pistol matching the description given by both victims was 
later found buried under some bushes alongside the path where defendant had been running. 
The district court admitted the gun over defendant's objection. 
Issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it held that the probative 
value of the gun was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Standard of Review: Appellate courts "review a trial court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence under Rule 403 . . . under an abuse of discretion standard, and will not 
overturn a lower court's determination of admissibility unless it is beyond the limits of 
reasonability." Glacier Land Co., L.L.G v. Claudia Klawe <&Assocs., L.L.C., 2006 UT App 516, 
^[12, -- P.3d — (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if the evidence was 
erroneously admitted, "that fact alone is insufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has had a 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "[ajlthough relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 11, 2005, defendant pointed a gun at two persons while running away 
from police. R. 1. An amended information was filed on May 11, 2006, charging defendant 
with aggravated assault, avoiding apprehension, and purchase, transfer, possession or use of 
a firearm by restricted person. R. 36-37. 
2 
Trial was originaUy scheduled for May 30-31, 2006. R. 49-50. On May 2, 2006, the 
State located a gun that it believed defendant had been carrying during the November 11 
encounter, and the parties agreed to continue the trial. R. 52, 94. On July 17, 2006, 
defendant filed a motion in limine asking that the gun be excluded under Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 68-71. The court denied defendant's motion. R. 100: 8. 
On August 7, 2006, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of 
aggravated assault and one count of possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person. R. 
86-87; 100: 10-16. In exchange, the State dropped the avoiding apprehension charge and 
reduced the aggravated assault charge to a third degree felony. R. 100: 10-11. Defendant 
expressly reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the 
gun. R. 100: 10-11. The district court sentenced defendant to one 0-5 year prison term and 
one 1-15 year prison term. R. 86-87; 100: 15-16. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal 
on August 14, 2006. R. 84. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On November 11, 2005, police were called when defendant was seen pointing a 
"silver or chrome gun" at another man on a street corner close to the Hostess Bakery Plant 
in Ogden, Utah. R. 91-92. Before officers arrived, Brian Pierce, an employee of the bakery, 
1
 The district court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of 
its decision to deny the motion in limine. R. 91-97 (attached as Addendum). Defendant has 
not marshaled the evidence nor offered any direct challenge to any of the court's factual 
findings. The State accordingly cites to those findings as being accepted for purposes of this 
appeal. Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, ffi[36-37, 989 P.2d 61. 
3 
saw defendant and began chasing him through the parking lot. R. 93.2 During the course of 
this chase, defendant turned toward Mr. Pierce, told him "to back off," and pointed a gun at 
Mr. Pierce from a distance of four feet Id. Mr. Pierce later described the gun as being a 
"chrome pistol." Id. 
Officer Ken Hammond of the Ogden City Police Department responded to the 
scene shortly thereafter. R. 91. When defendant saw Officer Hammond, defendant 
"immediately began running," and Officer Hammond began to chase defendant on foot. R. 
92. Defendant then pulled out what Officer Hammond later described as a "shiny, chrome 
handled, fully framed, full size, semiautomatic handgun" and pointed it at Officer Hammond 
from a distance of approximately fifteen yards Id. Though "Officer Hammond yelled at the 
Defendant to drop the gun several times," defendant did not drop the gun, but instead kept 
running and "pointed the gun at Officer Hammond a couple more times." R. 92-93. 
While running away from Officer Hammond, defendant ran by "some bushes . . . 
through a grassy area," and proceeded "between two semi trailers" into a large parking lot 
that adjoined the Hostess Bakery Plant. R. 92. "Due to the numerous areas the Defendant 
could hide and ambush him, Officer Hammond slowed his chase" and "took cover." R. 93. 
Officer Hammond "lost sight of the Defendant for approximately fifteen (15) seconds 
before he heard on his radio that another officer had the Defendant at gun point." Id. 
Though defendant was handcuffed and arrested on the scene, the officers were not able to 
locate the silver, chrome handgun at that time. R. 94. 
2
 Defendant indicated in his motion below that Mr. Pierce ccbegan to pursue 
Defendant through the parking lot because he thought he might have broken into one of the 
trucks." R. 69. 
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Defendant was charged with several criminal counts stemming from the incident, R. 
36-37, and a trial was scheduled for May 30-31, 2006. R. 49-50. On May 2, 2006, "an 
employee of the bakery plant was cleaning some tall bushes on the West side of the property 
near where the Defendant would have run on November 11, 2005." R. 94. "As the 
employee was raking some leaves underneath the bushes he discovered a very dirty, but 
silver Lorcin .380 semiautomatic handgun." Id. The "gun appeared as if it had been outside 
all winter and was very muddy and fouled with dirt." R. 95. Defendant's counsel later 
admitted that this gun matched the descriptions given by Officer Hammond and Brian 
Pierce regarding the gun that defendant had pointed at them. R. 100: 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the gun's probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice and that the gun therefore should have been excluded under Rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This argument should be rejected for three reasons. 
First, contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence linking this gun to his crime 
was at least sufficient to present it to the jury without any danger of unfair prejudice. 
Defendant's concerns over the gun's evidentiary value go to its weight, not its admissibility, 
and therefore are not a basis for excluding the gun under Rule 403. Second, although 
defendant may indeed have been prejudiced by the admission of this gun, this prejudice 
would have resulted from the gun's probative weight, not from a tendency to appeal to an 
improper basis for conviction. Defendant's reliance on Rule 403 is therefore improper. 
Third, even if this Court determines that the gun should have been excluded, the district 
5 
court's error was harmless given the unrebutted testimony showing that defendant pointed a 
gun at both Officer Hammond and Brian Pierce. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN RULING 
THAT THE GUN WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 403 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "[although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." "A Rule 403 analysis 
involves a balancing of probative value against the non-probative factors listed in Rule 403. 
The court's balancing under Rule 403 is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruling will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion." R. Collin Mangrum 
& Hon. Dee Benson, Mangnim & Benson on Utah Evidence 121 (2005). 
Defendant's arguments implicate both prongs of the Rule 403 balancing analysis. 
Specifically, defendant argues (1) that the evidence connecting this gun to this crime was too 
attenuated to allow it to be presented to the jury, and (2) that the gun would have unfairly 
prejudiced him by leading the jury to conclude that he had possessed and pointed it on 
November 11. Aplt. Br. 9-15. These arguments should be rejected. 
a. The evidence before the court created a reasonable inference that the gun 
was used by defendant in committing this crime. Defendant's concerns 
over the gun's evidentiary support go to its weight, not its admissibility. 
Under Rule 403, the probative value and the prejudicial effect of a piece of evidence 
are not considered in isolation, but are instead balanced against each other to determine 
6 
whether the evidence's prejudicial effect "substantially outweighs" the probative value. In 
this case, defendant asserts that the challenged gun's probative value was "virtually 
nonexistent." Aplt. Br. 14. This argument should be rejected. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a gun may be introduced for indirect, 
"illustrative purposes" in the absence of direct proof linking it to the crime in question. State 
v. Banks, 541 P.2d 808, 809 (Utah 1975). The State did not attempt to introduce this gun 
below as a mere illustration, however, but instead argued that this was in fact the gun that 
defendant used while committing his crime. R. 100: 8. 
It does not appear that any Utah appellate court has considered the question of how 
much evidentiary foundation a weapon must have in order to have probative value at trial. 
Other states that have examined this question, however, have consistently held that the 
prosecution does not need to irrefutably link a weapon to the actual crime in order to 
introduce the weapon at trial. In Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), 
for example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that "physical evidence need not be 
positively connected with the accused or the crime to be admissible; it is admissible where 
there is a reasonable probability of its connection with the accused or the crime." Id. at 1237 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In State v. Miller, 208 S.W.3d 284 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006), the Missouri Court of Appeals likewise held that "identifications of weapons 
need not be unequivocal. . . . To warrant the admission in evidence of an instrument or 
weapon . . . a prima facie showing of identity and connection with the crime is necessary and 
sufficient; clear, certain, and positive proof is not required." Id. at 288 (internal quotation 
7 
marks and citation omitted). Thus, "[a] weapon does not have to be tied ballistically to the 
crime to be admissible." People v. Prast, 319 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Mich. Ct App. 1982). 
The decision in Commonwealth v. Oliver, 61A A.2d 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), is 
particularly instructive given the facts at issue here. The victim in Oliver was beaten to death 
with a pipe in 1986, but Oliver and his conspirator were not arrested for the crime until 
1993. Id. at 289-90. Following the arrests, Oliver's conspirator began cooperating with the 
police and led them to a "forested area" "two-tenths of a mile from the murder scene" 
where the police found a pipe resembling the one used in the attack "30 feet off the [right 
hand side of the] road and 16 feet into the woods." Id. at 291 (alteration in original). Even 
though the pipe could not be scientifically tied to either the murder or to the defendant, and 
even though the pipe had been discovered in a forested area eight years after the commission 
of the crime, the appellate court still held that there was enough evidence to allow the 
weapon to be submitted to the jury. Id. at 291-92. According to the court, "[tjhere is no 
requirement that the item sought to be introduced into evidence is the actual weapon used in 
the attack." Id. at 291. Instead, "[t]he only burden is to justify, from the circumstances of 
the finding, can inference of the likelihood of its having been used.'" Id. (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 359 A.2d 393, 397 (Pa. 1976)). The court therefore rejected Oliver's 
Rule 403 challenge because (1) the pipe "was consistent" with the conspirator's description 
of the pipe used in the attack, and (2) the pipe had been located in "the approximate area" 
where the crime had occurred. Id. 
Though various courts have differed somewhat regarding the precise formulation of 
the rule, they have nevertheless consistently held that precise physical proof linking a 
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weapon to a crime is not required in order to support the weapon's admission. See, e.g., Mims 
v. State, 591 So.2d 120, 124 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (allowing admission of a gun "[w]here 
there is sufficient evidence to justify a reasonable inference that items were used by the 
accused in the commission of the crime charged"); Holloway v. State, 296 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1982) (ccWhere, as here, the victim of a crime identifies a weapon as similar to that 
used in the commission of the crime, the weapon is admissible whether or not it is the 
identical weapon") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Loa, 926 P.2d 
1258, 1273 (Haw. 1996) ("Evidence is admissible if the court, in the exercise of its wide 
discretion in such matters, decides that sufficient proof has been introduced so that a 
reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification." (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)); State p. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("An 
object is admissible into evidence if it tends to connect the defendant to the crime."); State v. 
Grooms, 540 S.E.2d 713, 727 (N.C. 2000) (rejecting a defendant's Rule 403 challenge to a 
weapon that was located near the victim's body and which matched the type of wound 
inflicted on the victim); State v. Provost, 352 So.2d 661, 664 (La. 1977) ("For the admission of 
demonstrative evidence, it suffices if the foundation laid establishes that it is more probable 
than not that the object is the one connected with the case."); State v. Kenny, 818 P.2d 420, 
425 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing admission of a gun because the victim had testified that 
the gun "was similar" to the gun held by the assailant and because the caliber of the 
proffered gun matched that of the crime weapon); State v. Evans, 742 A.2d 715, 720 (R.I. 
1999) ("When a handgun is offered into evidence it is relevant and admissible as long as 
there is a probability that it was connected to the crime charged."). 
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The district court below entered specific findings supporting a reasonable inference 
that this gun was used by defendant on November 11, 2005. The district court noted that 
the gun: (1) "matchefd] the description given by several witnesses"; (2) "was found in the 
area where the [d]efendant would have had access to dispose of it"; and (3) "was found in a 
condition indicative of the fact that it had been outside for quite a long time." R. 96. The 
court also noted that the gun was found "underneath the bushes" "on the West side of the 
property near where the Defendant would have run on November 11, 2005," R. 94, thus 
indicating that the gun had been deliberately hidden. 
It may theoretically be possible that some other unidentified person also had the need 
to hide a chrome semiautomatic pistol under the bushes by the Hostess Bakery Plant in 
Ogden during the 2005-06 winter, and it may also be theoretically possible that this 
unidentified person's gun matched the specific type, size, and color of the gun that was 
pointed at Officer Hammond and Brian Pierce. Contrary to defendant's assertions, 
however, the abstract possibility that some other person placed this gun under the bushes 
does not negate the very realistic probability that this was instead the gun that defendant 
pointed at Officer Ken Hammond and Brian Pierce. 
Defendant commits two fundamental legal errors in asserting otherwise. First, 
defendant's claim that Rule 403 generally prevents the admission of weak evidence 
improperly confuses the concepts of weight and admissibility. In State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 
1014 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that questions regarding "the 
persuasiveness of evidence" go to "weight, not . . . admissibility." Id. at 1016. In State v. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177, the court similarly held that "[i]t is . . . the responsibility of 
10 
the jury to evaluate the evidence and give its own weight to the evidence in rendering its 
verdict" Id. at ][42; see also Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, \M, 71 P.3d 601 ("[T]f [a 
party] wishes to discredit the testimony, or if he wishes the jury to give little weight to it— 
two notions that are separate issues from the admissibility of the testimony—he is, of 
course, welcome to invite an expert witness of his own to contradict" the witness.). 
This rule has been consistently applied by other courts that have considered 
challenges to the admissibility of weapons. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, for 
example, affirmed a lower court's decision to admit a revolver by holding that "[t]he lack of 
positive identification goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility. 
Ultimately, connexity of physical evidence is a factual matter for determination by the jury." 
Mims, 591 So.2d at 124 (quoting State v. Nelson, 259 So.2d 46, 51-52 (La. 1972)); see also Aiken, 
647 A.2d at 1231-32 ("the lack of positive identification affects only the weight of the 
evidence" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Olson, 436 N.W.2d at 820 ("The 
lack of an absolute connection between the object introduced into evidence and the alleged 
crime does not affect the admissibility of the challenged evidence, but only its weight."); 
Miller, 208 S.W.3d at 288 ("Less than absolute identifications of real evidence speak to the 
weight of the evidence, not admissibility."); Provost, 352 So.2d at 665; Commonwealth v. Moore, 
567 A.2d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). In this case, the district court rejected defendant's 
motion based on its conclusion that issues of "weight and credibility [are] for the jury to 
decide." R. 96. That conclusion was correct. 
Second, defendant is also incorrect in asserting that a weapon should generally be 
excluded based on the passage of time between the crime and the discovery of the weapon. 
11 
"Remoteness goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of evidence." Olympus Hills Shopping 
Ctr.} Ltd. v. Smith's Food <& Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
"The fact that a considerable length of time elapsed after the crime before the weapon or 
instrument was found . . . goes to the probative force but not the admissibility of the 
evidence." Miller, 208 S.W.3d at 288 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "As 
the interval of time between the possession of the instrument of crime and the criminal 
event lengthens, the probative value of the evidence may become more tenuous, but that 
consideration is one for the jury to resolve in evaluating the weight of the evidence; the 
competency of the evidence is not affected." Commonwealth v. Clark, 421 A.2d 374, 375-77 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); see also Mayfield v. State, 588 So.2d 215, 217-18 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); 
People v. Taylor, 804 P.2d 196, 201-02 (Colo. Ct App. 1990); Holliday v. State, 389 So.2d 679, 
681 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1980); State v. Fenton, 620 P.2d 813, 821 (Kan. 1980); State v. Smith, 32 
S.W.3d 532, 554 (Mo. 2000); State v. Murillo, 509 S.E.2d 752, 763 (N.C. 1998); Oliver, 61A 
A.2d at 292; Thompson v. State, 59 S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex. App. 2001); Walker v. Commonwealth, 
515 S.E.2d 565, 573-74 (Va. 1999); State v. Mcintosh, 534 S.E.2d 757, 768 (W.Va. 2000). 
Had defendant in this case not pleaded guilty and instead gone to trial, he would have, 
had every opportunity to discuss the perceived flaws in the State's evidence with the jury. 
He could have pointed to the lack of fingerprints, to the 172-day gap, and to the fact that the 
bushes where the gun had been buried were accessible to the public. The State, in turn, 
would have noted that the gun matched the description given by a civilian who saw the gun 
from a distance of four feet, that it also matched the description given by a trained police 
officer who saw the gun from a distance of approximately fifteen yards, that it was found 
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buried alongside the very path where defendant had run while fleeing from police, and that it 
was discovered in a condition indicative of having sat outside throughout the winter. As 
with all other pieces of evidence, the jury would have been entirely ftree to give this piece of 
evidence whatever weight it deemed appropriate. Contrary to defendant's assertions, 
however, the gun was sufficiently connected to this crime to have had clear probative value 
for purposes of Rule 403. 
b. Although defendant may have been prejudiced by the admission of this 
gun, this prejudice would have resulted from the gun's probative weight 
not from a tendency to appeal to an improper basis for conviction. 
Under the second prong of the Rule 403 balancing, evidence can be excluded where 
the probative value "is substantially outweighed" by the danger of "unfair prejudice." 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the admission of this gun would not have been unfairly 
prejudicial under Rule 403. 
It "would be difficult to conceive of a trial at which the prosecution's evidence was 
not prejudicial to the defendant." Moore, 567 A.2d at 706. Rule 403 is only implicated 
"when the evidence is so prejudicial that it sweeps the jury beyond a rational consideration 
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Thus, while "[v]irtually all evidence is prejudicial—if the truth be told, that is 
almost always why the proponent seeks to introduce it— . . . it is only unfair prejudice against 
which the law protects." United States v. Barrow, 448 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original), cert denied, 127 S.Ct. 176 (2006). 
The question before this Court is whether the prejudice that defendant would have 
suffered would have qualified as "unfair prejudice." In State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 
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1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that unfair prejudice within the context of Rule 403 
"means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis." Id. at 984 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). In general, evidence is deemed to be directed at an 
"improper basis" when it has an undue tendency to "cause the jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propositions of the case." State v. Undgren, 910 P.2d 
1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such 
evidence "commonly, though not necessarily" appeals to such "emotion[s]" as "bias, 
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984. Rule 403 is 
therefore an "inclusionary rule," and "presumes the admission of all relevant evidence except 
where the evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the 
jury." State v. Ramire^ 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah Ct. App 1996) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also Mangrwn <& Benson on Utah Evidence at 123 (stating that Rule 403 
"favors admissibility"). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the gun in question would not have "tempt[ed]" 
the jury to base its ruling on "something other than the established propositions of the 
case." Aplt. Br. 13. Instead, the gun goes to the central question at issue: whether defendant 
actually possessed a chrome semiautomatic handgun and pointed it at Officer Hammond 
and Brian Pierce. Nothing about this gun speaks to bias, or hatred, or horror, or to any of 
the other emotion-laden examples of impermissible prejudice under Rule 403. Nothing 
about this gun directs the jury toward an irrational conclusion that is removed from the 
elements of this crime. While this gun may very well have had a prejudicial effect on this 
case, the prejudicial effect would have been based on the fact that the gun was linked to the 
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circumstances and location of the crime and that it matched the stories of the two victims. 
This type of corroborative, probative evidence is simply not barred by Rule 403. 
Defendant additionally asserts that he would have been unfairly prejudiced by being 
forced to cross-examine the State's witnesses regarding the gun. Aplt. Br. 14-15. Defendant 
would apparently have this Court adopt a rule allowing for the exclusion of evidence if any 
party feels the need to challenge it at trial. This argument is at odds with the basic structure 
of the American judicial system, however, which regards cross-examination and adversarial 
testing as optimal means for uncovering truth. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
61 (2004); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990) (referring to "adversarial testing" as 
"the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings"). Rather than preventing juries from 
deciding hard factual questions, the American system explicitly trusts juries to do exactly 
that. Rule 403 does not purport to alter the structure of this system, and defendant's 
argument to the contrary should be rejected. 
In prosecuting a defendant, "the government is perfectly free to introduce weak, as 
well as strong, evidence." United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 222 (1st Cir. 1990). 
"Under our system . . . a party offers his evidence not en masse, but item by item. An item of 
evidence . . . need not prove conclusively the proposition for which it is offered. . . . A brick 
is not a wall." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As in Maravilla, "[n]o one 
claimed that this particular piece of evidence proved guilt. It was merely one piece of 
evidence among many." Id. The district court therefore did not err in ruling that the gun 
could be submitted to the jury. 
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c. Even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting the gun, the 
error was harmless. 
Defendant claims that "the prosecutors would be unable to convict" him without the 
gun. Aplt. Br. 15. This Court should reject that argument and instead hold that even if the 
district court did abuse its discretion in admitting the gun, this error was harmless. 
An error is deemed harmless if the error "is sufficiently inconsequential that there is 
no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. 'Evans, 
2001 UT 22, T[20, 20 P.3d 888. With regard to evidentiary questions, "[e]ven if the evidence 
was erroneously admitted, that fact alone is insufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has had 
a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^[47, 52 P.3d 
1210 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
It is well-established that eyewitness testimony alone can be sufficient to convict a 
defendant of even serious crimes such as murder. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1213 
(Utah 1993) (holding that testimony of witnesses "is legally sufficient, standing alone, to 
support a conviction"); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,1261 (Utah 1988) (noting that 
defendant's "commission of violent acts at the jail was proven by undisputed eyewitness 
testimony which we conclude was sufficient to prove his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"); 
State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 612 (Utah 1986) (holding that even "[wjithout more, the 
eyewitness testimony of observing inmates [was] sufficient to support" a conviction). 
In State v. Madrigal, 721 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio Supreme Court considered 
a case like this one where a defendant was convicted of having used a gun during the 
commission of a crime. Id. at 63-65. The district court had allowed the prosecution to 
introduce a gun as evidence, even though no witness was able to "definitively say it was the 
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gun used" in the crime. Id. at 64. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court had erred 
by admitting the evidence. Id. After rejecting the defendant's suppression argument, the 
Ohio Supreme Court noted that the conviction would still have been proper even if the gun 
had been suppressed because eyewitnesses had testified to having seen the defendant with a 
gun. Id. 
As in Madrigal, defendant's conviction here was supported by testimony from 
multiple witnesses. Specifically, Brian Pierce observed defendant point a gun at him from a 
distance of "four feet," while Officer Hammond observed defendant point a gun at him 
from a distance of approximately fifteen yards. R. 92-93. Given this testimony, it was not 
necessary for the State to locate the gun that defendant had used in order to obtain a 
conviction. Instead, as in Madrigal, the State could have properly prosecuted and convicted 
defendant based on nothing more than the eyewitness testimony of his two victims. In fact, 
the State originally intended to do just that, and a trial was scheduled several months prior to 
the gun ever being located. R. 49-50. 
Thus, even if the district court had erred in admitting the gun, this Court should 
nevertheless hold that this error was harmless and affirm the conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The gun in question was linked to defendant by multiple witnesses who saw him 
carrying it, as well as by the location and conditions surrounding the gun's discovery. For 
the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted on March 13, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
0. 
RYA&4D.TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER CASTILLO 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
Case No. 051905870 
Judge ROGER S. DUTSON 
On July 31, 2006, this matter came before the Court for a hearing on Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress evidence of a firearm found near the location the Defendant had disposed of it 
several months previously. Jim Retallick represented the Defendant. Branden Miles represented 
the State. After receiving a memorandum from the Defendant and hearing oral arguments from 
both parties, the Court ruled from the bench. The Court makes the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 11, 2005, Officer Ken Hammond of the Ogden City Police 
Department responded to the area of 2600 Lincoln on a report from a citizen of a 
man, wearing black pants and a black hoodie, pointing a silver or chrome gun at 
another man. 
2. The witness reported seeing the man put the object he believed was a gun into the 
right, front pocket of his hoodie. 
3. Officer Hammond responded to the area and as he approached the area he noticed 
a man matching that description walking on the sidewalk. 
4. The man was also wearing black gloves. 
5. The man was eventually identified as the Defendant Christopher Simon Castillo. 
6. When the Defendant noticed Officer Hammond, he immediately began running 
and turned the comer around a fence and some bushes to run through a grassy area 
adjoining the 2nd District Court's parking lot. 
7. Officer Hammond accelerated his vehicle, stopped it on the sidewalk, exited his 
vehicle and began to chase the Defendant. 
8. Officer Hammond was running approximately fifteen yards behind the Defendant 
yelling "stop police" repeatedly. 
9. Officer Hammond also yelled "show me your hands!" 
10. The Defendant continued to run when he began to tug on the right-front side of his 
hoodie. 
11. The Defendant pulled out a "shiny, chrome handled, fully framed, full size, 
semiautomatic handgun" from his pocket and pointed it at Officer Hammond. 
12. Officer Hammond continued to chase the man, but the man cut between two semi 
trailers into the Hostess Bakery parking lot that adjoins the 2nd District Court's 
parking lot to the South. 
13. Officer Hammond yelled at the Defendant to drop the gun several times. 
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14. Officer Hammond continued to chase the Defendant where the Defendant pointed 
the gun at Officer Hammond a couple more times before disappearing between a 
couple more trailers. 
15. Due to the numerous areas the Defendant could hide and ambush him, Officer 
Hammond slowed his chase and took cover. 
16. An employee of the Bakery was in the parking lot named Brian Pierce. 
17. Mr. Pierce reported that while he was chasing the Defendant in the parking earlier, 
he observed the Defendant with the gun and the Defendant pointed the gun at him 
from four feet away. 
18. The Defendant told Mr. Pierce to back off. 
19. Apparently, the Defendant made two loops from the outside of the bakery plant on 
Lincoln, to the courthouse parking lot, through the bakery plant, and then back out 
to Lincoln which is when Officer Hammond first observed the Defendant and 
chased him back into the bakery parking lot. 
20. It was during this first trip though the bakery lot that the Defendant threatened Mr. 
Pierce. 
21. Mr. Pierce described the gun as "chrome pistol." 
22. Officer Hammond had radioed that he was in pursuit of a man with a gun and 
other police officers were converging on the area to set up a perimeter. 
23. Officer Hammond lost sight of the Defendant for approximately fifteen (15) 
seconds before he heard on his radio that another officer had the Defendant at gun 
point. 
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24. Officer Hammond ran over to the other side of the trailers and across the parking 
lot further South where he observed the Defendant laying on the ground in a prone 
position. 
25. Officer Hammond ran up and handcuffed the Defendant. 
26. The Defendant's person was searched, but the handgun Officer Hammond, the 
citizen, and several bakery plant employees observed was not located on the 
Defendant. 
27. Several members of the police, Crime Scene Unit, and bakery plant employees 
began checking the area in an attempt to find the gun. 
28. There were approximately seven or eight people looking for about an hour and the 
gun was not located. 
29. Areas inside and under the truck and trailers, the bushes, and under trees were 
searched with a rake, but the gun was not located at that time. 
30. The Defendant was arrested and charged with Aggravated Assault, a third degree 
felony and Avoiding Apprehension, a class A misdemeanor. 
31. On May 2, 2006, an employee of the bakery plant was cleaning some tall bushes 
on the West side of the property near where the Defendant would have run on 
November 11, 2005. 
32. As the employee was raking some leaves underneath the bushes he discovered a 
very dirty, but silver Lorcin .380 semiautomatic handgun. 
33. The cleaning employee picked up the gun in a shovel and took it to a plant 
manager. 
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34. The plant manager, concerned about having a possible loaded firearm in the plant, 
proceeded to unload the gun. 
35. The plant manager stated the gun appeared as if it had been outside all winter and 
was very muddy and fouled with dirt. 
36. The manager used a screw driver to pry the magazine from the gun and unloaded 
all the ammunition. 
37. The manager then called the police and turned the gun, the magazine, and several 
bullets over to Officer David Gentry from the Ogden City Police Department. 
38. Officer Gentry took the firearm and placed it into evidence. 
39. The firearm's serial number had been filed off. 
40. Crime Scene Technician Brandi Child was able to restore the number and tried to 
fingerprint the surface of the gun. 
41. There were no fingerprints discovered on the gun and the gun was not reported 
stolen. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant requests this Court to exclude evidence of the gun at trial because 
he claims the prejudice of admitting the gun as evidence will outweigh any 
probative value it may have. 
2. The Defendant's claimed prejudice is based on what he perceives is the tenuous 
connection between the gun and him because there were no prints found or other 
physical evidence linking him to the gun. 
3. The Defendant's claim that the relevance of this gun is "too remote to trust that a 
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jury will not get caught up in the emotions of the charged offenses" is without 
merit because the physical specimen of the gun is just one piece of physical 
evidence that does not change the facts and allegations against the Defendant that 
he claims are improperly prejudicial. 
4. The gun, found almost six months after the original offense, is relevant evidence 
because it matches the description given by several witnesses, it was found in the 
area where the Defendant would have had access to dispose of it, and it was found 
in a condition indicative of the fact that it had been outside for quite a long time. 
5. The Defendant's objections to the relevance of the gun are a matter of weight and 
credibility for the jury to decide. 
6. The Defendant would have ample opportunity at trial to raise all of the issues he 
wants to raise about the possibility that this gun was not the actual gun used or the 
claim that he had a gun at all. 
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ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Denied, 
DATED this / day o£Augu3L2006. 
ROGEP/S. DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Prepared by: 
;/?^/7 / S AyX^{ 
iden B. Miles 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J§mes Retalhck 
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